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The dominant emotion in violence-threatening situations is confrontational tension/fear (ct/f), which causes most violence to abort, or to be carried out 
inaccurately and incompetently. For violence to be successful, there must be a pathway around the barrier of ct/f. These pathways include: attacking the 
weak; audience-oriented staged and controlled fair "ghts; confrontation-avoiding remote violence; confrontation-avoiding by deception; confrontation-
avoiding by absorption in technique. Successfully violent persons, on both sides of the law, are those who have developed these skilled interactional 
techniques. Since successful violence involves dominating the emotional attention space, only a small proportion of persons can belong to the elite which 
does most of each type of violence. Macro-violence, including victory and defeat in war, and in struggles of paramilitaries and social movements, is shaped 
by both material resources and social/emotional resources for maintaining violent organizations and forcing their opponents into organizational breakdown. 
Social and emotional destruction generally precedes physical destruction.
Micro and Macro Causes of Violence
Randall Collins, Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, United States
1. Introduction
!ere are a large number of kinds of violence, and no 
simple theory will explain all of them. Domestic abuse 
does not have the same causes as dueling, not to mention 
player violence in sports, police violence, war, armed rob-
bery, or ethnic massacre. No theory of individual motives 
for violence will explain much of what actually happens, 
not only because motivations for violence are diverse, but 
because most attempts at violence are abortive and most 
violent actors are incompetent. Socio-demographic catego-
ries are very weak predictors of violence, since there are far 
more persons who are (to name the usual suspects) male, 
young, or disadvantaged than the number who are violent. 
Interactionally, committing legitimate violence (such as war 
or policing) depends on similar processes to illegitimate 
(criminal) violence; this is another reason why social back-
grounds remote from the interactional situation cannot be a 
general explanation of violence. 
How then can we shape a theory that will explain the vari-
eties of violence? My strategy is to begin with a key feature 
of interaction in violence-threatening situations: confron-
tational tension and fear (ct/f ). Using evidence of photo-
graphs, physiology, reports of subjective experience, and 
behavior, I conclude that the dominant emotion in violent 
confrontations is tension, sometimes rising to the level of 
paralyzing fear, and almost always making the performance 
of violent acts inaccurate and incompetent.1 Most persons 
in violent situations do little or nothing, and that minority 
who do shoot or punch o"en miss their targets, hit inno-
cent bystanders or their own side. Soldiers and police are 
much more accurate on shooting ranges than they are in 
actual combat, and the intention to be violent does not itself 
determine what will happen when there is an actual con-
frontation. Humans are not naturally good at violence in 
real-life situations; direct confrontation with human beings 
produces physiological stress which makes violence largely 
incompetent. !e existence of anger can lead us to overesti-
1 Evidence for my arguments in this  paper 
are found in Collins 2008; for the  ubiquity 
of fear among combatants and its e&ects 
on violence, see also Grossman 2004
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mate its causal importance; although anger is a widespread 
and evolutionarily based emotion, it does not automatically 
or easily turn into violence. !e expression of anger usually 
is bluster, impassioned gestures which are characteristic of 
stando&s rather than actual violence.
In this paper, I draw on a larger work on the micro-soci-
ology of violence (Collins 2008). Its emphasis is on how 
violence happens or fails to happen, in the immediate 
situations where humans threaten each other in naturalistic 
settings. It draws heavily on evidence from video record-
ings, photographs, ethnographic observations, and in-depth 
interviews, bolstered where possible by historical compari-
sons and relevant reports in the research literature. It is 
micro in its emphasis on small slices of time, sometimes on 
the order of fractions of seconds, and on the emotions, body 
postures, sounds, and movements, both synchronized and 
at cross purposes, that make up the details of violent action. 
In this case, the main part of the theory is in the details, the 
micro-mechanisms. !e book emphasizes, as well, the di-
versity of kinds of violence. A common thread among them 
is the existence of ct/f, while their diversity comes from the 
variety of pathways around the barrier of ct/f which other-
wise keeps threatened violence from happening. A compan-
ion volume, now in progress, connects micro-mechanisms 
of violence with large-scale macro-violence.
!e (rst part of the paper will examine micro-interactional 
violence: what happens on the level of situations where 
individuals or groups confront one another. On this basis, 
the second part will discuss macro-violence, large patterns 
over time and space.
2. Micro Violence
For violence to be successful, persons must (nd a pathway 
around the barrier of confrontational tension. !ere are (ve 
such pathways:
1. Attacking the weak.
2. Audience-oriented staged and controlled fair (ghts.
3. Confrontation-avoiding remote violence.
4. Confrontation-avoiding by deception.
5. Confrontation-avoiding by absorption in technique.
2.1. Pathway I: Attacking the weak 
Attacking the weak is the most common form of violence. 
Photographic evidence of the active phase of crowd violence 
almost invariably shows the crowd split into small clusters, 
with a group of three to six persons attacking an isolated in-
dividual, who has usually fallen to the ground. !e pattern 
is found in many di&erent ethnic combinations all over the 
world; it applies alike to police violence, and to violence by 
nationalists, labor, political movements of any ideology, and 
by sports fans. !e most successful form of gang violence is 
when a rival individual or dyad is caught by a larger group 
out of their own turf. Most successful violence is thus very 
one-sided, not so much a (ght as a beating. In contrast, 
when groups confront each other in concentrated numbers, 
there is typically a stando& con(ned to bluster, insult, and 
eventually deescalation through boredom; and the same is 
generally true when isolated individuals quarrel.
Professional criminals learn techniques of attacking weak 
victims; the key is not so much physical dominance as 
(nding those who are situationally weak. Muggers learn 
to approach from behind and to locate a fearful or startled 
target; successful robbers develop timing, dramatic gestures 
(including those made with their weapons) in order to catch 
their victim interactionally o& guard, imposing the attack-
er’s momentum on the situation.
Bullying is a long-term, institutionalized form of attacking 
the weak. Bullies in schools and prisons do not attack popu-
lar and socially connnected persons but isolates who are 
emotionally intimidated; the bullying becomes perpetuated 
as the victim becomes trained into a subservient relation-
ship, which o"en constitutes that individual’s entire social 
network. As in most violence, success comes more from 
attacking the emotionally weak than the physically weak.
One spectacularly atrocious form of attacking the weak 
takes the form I have called forward panic. !is is a dy-
namic sequence over a period of minutes or hours. It begins 
with a tense con.ict, such as a chase or a prolonged con-
frontation in battle; then one side suddenly shows itself 
to be weak—by falling down, retreating in confusion, or 
becoming emotionally dominated; this sets o& the other 
side, which rushes upon the now-weak victim in a mood of 
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hot rush, piling on, and overkill. Military massacres usually 
follow a tense stando& which is broken by organizational 
chaos on one side; at such moments the victims become 
emotionally passive and unresisting, asymmetrically 
entrained with the emotional dominance of the attack-
ers. If a retreating enemy cannot be found, forward panic 
may lead to the killing of civilians who are in the targeted 
area. !e famous atrocities of police violence are typically 
forward panics begun by high-speed chases. Violence is 
prolonged into what outside observers perceive as overkill; 
the attackers are caught up in their own emotional rush, 
self-entrained in the bodily rhythms of their own violence, 
for a period of time unable to stop beating the opponent or 
(ring their guns.
Domestic violence comes in several forms. !e most violent 
form of domestic abuse resembles bullying: one partner 
(usually male) trains the spouse into subservience based 
on repeated taunting and degradation; like bully victims, 
such spouses tend to be social isolates whose entire network 
is comprised by their abuser. Domestic violence however 
varies across a spectrum; more frequent is symmetrical 
couple violence, practiced equally by males and females, in 
minor scu/es and escalated quarrels; here violence is kept 
within bounds, as equal-sided violence usually is. A third 
type of domestic violence is forward panic, beginning with 
tense quarrels, suddenly errupting into angry emotional 
dominance by one partner, with violence taking the form of 
a prolonged beating or use of weapons—overkill resulting 
from emotional self-entrainment. !ese moments of seem-
ingly irrational, continued frenzy of attack are typically ex-
perienced as dream-like or distorted consciousness; I have 
referred to it as going into the emotional tunnel of violence.
During their interactional history, couples develop their 
own pattern of emotional equality or inequality which 
determines the degree and kind of violence. Each type of 
violence is learned as an interactional skill; in the more 
repetitive kinds of violence (relationship violence), the inter-
actants learn their roles together. !is situational explana-
tion has an optimistic side: police, soldiers, and other of-
(cial agents can be put on their guard against the emotional 
dynamics of forward panic; attention to interactional skills 
in domestic situations, schools, and total institutions could 
also head o& attacks on the weak.
2.2. Pathway II: Audience-oriented, Staged, and Controlled Fair Fights
!e audience-oriented, staged, and controlled fair (ght is 
the idealized and culturally celebrated form of violence. In 
contrast to attacking the weak, which is dirty, secret, and 
very unpleasant to witness (hence regarded as atrocity when 
it comes to light), staged (ghters are treated as social elites. 
Duels, historically, were limited to the aristocracy or gentle-
man class; they followed rules and were scheduled for par-
ticular times and places; although sometimes deadly, duels 
limited violence to a short period of stylized con.ict, and 
a"erwards (unlike vendettas) declared the matter settled. 
Like all violence, staged fair (ghts must overcome the bar-
rier of confrontational tension/fear; they do so by directing 
attention to the audience in front of whom the (ghters must 
perform; micro-interactionally, the (ghters are focussed 
not merely on the confrontation but on how they look while 
they are carrying out the dispute. A contemporary equiva-
lent of staged fair (ghts occurs in communities like high 
schools where reputations are widely known; thus (st-(ghts 
are arranged for the playground a"er school, with an audi-
ence cheering on the (ght, but also limiting it.
Staged (ghts are o"en used as gang initiations, in this case 
with a degree of asymmetry since the novice must prove 
himself against a more powerful opponent. Fights inside 
gangs are generally staged as limited fair (ghts. Fights 
between gangs, however, are attempts to (nd a momentary 
situation of attacking the weak; drive-by shootings are 
one-sided, not full-scale battles with (ring by both sides. 
Full-scale (ghts between gangs have the same problem as 
military battles: most display of violence between assembled 
groups is bluster, even when it takes the form of making 
noise with guns; as long as both sides maintain the con-
frontation, most shooting is inaccurate. Prolonged violence 
between gangs thus usually takes the form of a vendetta or 
cycle of reciprocal killings; this is a series of unfair (ghts, 
alternating attacks on an isolated or surprised situationally 
weak victim from each side in turn. Because such situa-
tions are not easy to (nd, vendettas may take a long time; 
contrary to idealized images of reciprocity, vendettas o"en 
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peter out, through incompetence and loss of emotional 
energy.
Staged fair (ghts are the format for many kinds of competi-
tive sports. Fighting among players outside the rules also 
occurs, and this typically takes the form of symmetrical 
(ghts between equal numbers from both sides; it always in-
volves tacit rules which limit the amount of damage, and it 
is emotionally supported by the crowd of spectators. Player 
violence follows the emotional rhythm of the game, and 
is predictable at dramatic moments at the peak of struggle 
for emotional dominance. We should note, again (as in the 
case of domestic violence), that several analytically dif-
ferent kinds of violence can take place in what appears to 
be the same rubric: sports violence is split among several 
types, since it does not consist of one single technique for 
circumventing the barrier of confrontational tension, but 
two di&erent kinds: the players are the honori(c elite, who 
(ght fairly (i.e. equally matched); spectators’ violence, in 
contrast, is a form of attacking the weak, such as the mass of 
the crowd attacking visiting-team players or small minori-
ties of opposing fans. Soccer hooligans, who arrange (ghts 
with opposing fans away from the stadium, act like other 
violent crowds, and unleash violence (as opposed to bluster) 
only when they have an outnumbered enemy broken into 
isolated fragments that can be attacked by larger groups. 
!e di&erence between these subtypes of sports violence 
shows that fair (ghts depend on the existence of an audi-
ence which treats the (ghters as elite; lacking this, sports 
violence by fans falls back into the easiest form, attacking 
the weak.
Probably the most frequent audience-oriented violence 
consists in (ghts at entertainment venues, bars, and par-
ties. Although the common denominator might seem to 
be alcohol, my calculations (for both the United States and 
the United Kingdom) show that the proportion of drunken 
episodes which lead to violence is on the order of 1 to 7 per-
cent (the higher (gure in the United Kingdom).2 Violence 
remains di2cult to carry o&, as ct/f must be overcome even 
if antagonists are drunk. My comparison of ethnographic 
episodes shows that the attitude of the crowd is highly 
in.uential: when the crowd cheers and supports the (ght, 
it is prolonged; when the crowd is divided or ambivalent, 
(ghts are short and mild; when the crowd is uninterested 
or opposed, (ghts abort (Collins 2008: 202–6).3 Drunken 
violence is also limited by the pattern that one (ght per 
venue takes up the attention of the audience, and eliminates 
emotional support for additional (ghts on that occasion.
On the whole, audience-oriented fair (ghts produce quite 
limited violence compared to attacking the weak; even 
dueling with weapons did not cause many casualties 
because much shooting or sword-play was ine&ective, and 
there were widespread provisions for ending the duel short 
of death. !is suggests a policy implication. More realis-
tic than the utopian ideal of eliminating all violence, the 
amount of violence could be limited if the types of (ghts 
which normally involve attacking the weak (such as drive-
bys and vendettas) could be substituted by staged fair (ghts.
2.3. Pathway III: Confrontation-avoiding Remote Violence
!e easiest way to carry out violence is entirely to avoid 
direct confrontation with the opponent. In military combat, 
long distance (indirect (re) weapons—artillery, aerial 
bombs, rockets—are psychologically easier to operate and 
invoke less shirking and non-(ring, and also cause more 
casualties than guns used in direct battle(eld confron-
tation. !e di2culty from a military viewpoint is that 
long-distance weapons are expensive, use up a large amount 
of munitions per casualty, and may be quite inaccurate 
without clear identi(cation of the location of the enemy—
and nearby civilians. Guerrilla or terrorist tactics using 
remote-controlled bombs (IEDs) are similarly easy to use 
insofar as they avoid c/tf. Long-distance weapons are much 
less frequent in violence among civilians; they are gener-
ally very expensive or require considerable organization to 
operate them e&ectively (even roadside bombs need a team 
and local complicity). Hence distance weapons—chie.y 
2 Calculations based on surveys of binge 
drinking, compared to victim surveys 
of assault (Collins 2008, 265–7).
3 Total of 89 (rst-hand observations of violence-
threatening confrontations, compiled from my 
own observations and from student reports.
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bombs—are sometimes used in organized crime, but not in 
ordinary gang (ghting or individual crime.
An exception here would be mass poison attacks (such as 
anthrax) through the mail; nevertheless these are the rarest 
of violent acts. Long-distance violence is a&ected by social 
support, as are all other kinds of violence. Violence carried 
out by big organizations—governments, armies, guerrilla 
movements—has a strong ideological component which 
legitimates and moralizes it at least in the eyes of most 
members of their communities. Long-distance violence 
by an isolated individual—someone who mails anthrax 
letters—is morally condemned by virtually everyone. Lack-
ing social support, such isolated individuals have rarely had 
much success in causing casualties. Mass murderers and se-
rial killers, in comparison, have occasionally killed dozens 
or even a few hundred victims; the most proli(c of these 
have been medical personnel who poisoned individuals, one 
at a time, by clandestine administration of medicine—thus 
avoiding confrontation via deception, rather than by long-
distance weapons. !e more typical serial killer engages in 
confrontation, using conventional weapons (guns, knives); 
their technique has been to locate a reliable source of weak 
victims (isolated street prostitutes, immigrant nurses, 
homeless boys) and to keep up a conventional identity 
behind which their clandestine violence was intermit-
tently carried out. Such techniques are very unusual; serial 
killings are by far the rarest type of murder, comprising a 
fraction of one percent of all murders.
2.4. Pathway IV: Confrontation-avoiding by Deception
!e most competent violence is that which reliably hits its 
target, achieves its kill. !e vast majority of threatened or 
attempted violence is completely ine&ective, remaining 
abortive. Attacking the weak (technique no. 1) is episodic 
and can be rather unpredictable (from the point of view 
of its perpetrators’ intentions), and when it happens the 
result is typically irrational overkill. Audience-oriented 
staged (ghts (technique no. 2) usually come o& as planned, 
but the pair format tends to limit the amount of violence 
done. Long-distance violence (technique no. 3) has serious 
problems of imprecision and target identi(cation. !e most 
e&ective violence, with the highest chance of success, is this 
fourth type, where the attacker gets up close to the victim 
and shoots him/her in the head from a few inches away, or 
carries a bomb right up to the target and detonates it. In 
order to do so, the key tactic is a clandestine approach, re-
quiring good information about the target and an attacker 
disguised as normal and non-threatening. !e technique is 
shared by professional contract killers and suicide-bombing 
terrorists. 
In both cases, the killer avoids confrontational tension be-
cause he or she (here the term is not merely pro forma, since 
suicide bombing is the one form of violence in which a sub-
stantial number of killers are women) is concentrating on 
presenting a normal everyday self; the attacker’s attention 
is on the Go&manian staging rather than on the confronta-
tion with the enemy. !e process of deceiving others also 
helps to deceive oneself; the adrenalin rush which makes 
confrontation so di2cult and violence so inaccurate is 
replaced with calm. Suicide bombings are the most e&ective 
form of terrorism, killing the largest average number per 
incident. !e technique is very far from most other kinds of 
violence; it lacks the crowd support of audience-oriented vi-
olence, and avoids the extreme adrenalin rushes of forward 
panics; it is very distant, too, from the normal blustering 
and ritual insulting which makes up most confrontations in 
crowds and in gangs. !us it should not be surprising that 
suicide bombers rarely come from a criminal background, 
but are quiet, well-behaved middle-class individuals. !e 
technique demands either a background culture of self-
restraint and politeness, or highly disciplined learning. !e 
latter appears to be the pathway for professional hitmen 
(in high-level organized crime, they are virtually all men): 
within the crime community, they are regarded as a special 
elite because they are the ultimate insider, viewed with high 
respect by most other criminals.
!ere is an important element of clandestine deceptiveness 
in the techniques of serial killers as well as rampage killers 
(such as those who attack schools; Newman et al. 2004) 
Much of their motivational buildup comes from the period 
of preparation for the attack, secretly storing up weapons, 
planning the details of the attack, even practicing and 
rehearsing. !ey take delight in having an exciting back-
stage life which is denied to them in conventional social life. 
It has been noted that school rampage killers are isolated, 
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socially unpopular, even bully victims; it should be added 
that they are not gang members or otherwise embarked on 
criminal careers. !e techniques of violence in gangs and in 
crime are not those of confrontation-avoiding violence, but 
rather the opposite, the use of .amboyant, message-sending 
violence, o"en more as symbolic statement than as real 
destruction. Because there are a variety of social techniques 
of successful violence, violent persons can emerge from 
quite di&erent social contexts; we cannot (nd a single back-
ground pro(le or personality for violence.
2.5. Pathway V: Confrontation-avoiding by Absorption in Technique
A small number of individuals are very e&ective at violence. 
In every arena of violence, a small proportion of the total 
nominally engaged population does the great majority of 
the violence; this pattern was initially found in World War 
II, where 15–25 percent of the frontline infantry were doing 
almost all the (ring, and is paralleled by the small number 
of active rioters in a rioting crowd, the small proportion 
of police who account for most of the use-of-force inci-
dents, and the small proportion of criminals who do large 
numbers of crimes. What is distinctive about this “violent 
elite,” those who are much better at violence whereas most 
of their peers are incompetent or hanging back? It is tempt-
ing to call them sociopathic personalities; but this does not 
account for the fact that the pattern is found on both sides 
of the law, that small numbers of ace (ghter pilots account 
for the majority of enemy aircra" destroyed, and a small 
number of military snipers kill far more than the average 
combat soldier. In addition, the sociopathic explanation im-
plies that these individuals are socially incompetent; but in 
fact, violence is a technique that must be learned; it involves 
sensitivity to the emotional components of interaction, 
careful observation of others, and in the case of clandestine 
approaches, a great deal of self-control. Psychologically 
reductionist labels point us in the wrong direction; instead 
we must examine the career trajectories of persons through 
violence-using groups, which result in some few becoming 
near-monopolists of the skills of competent violence.
A close-up view of those skills comes from the practices 
and subjective phenomenology of the highest-performing 
military killers (Collins 2008: 381–87; interviews in Pegler 
2004 are especially useful). Snipers are less sociable and 
group-oriented than other soldiers; they spend much of 
their time observing enemy hiding places and vulnerabili-
ties, and (nding hiding places of their own where they can 
operate without detection. Snipers are unusually focussed 
on the enemy, and attempt to select particular individu-
als through high-powered scopes. How then do they avoid 
confrontational tension? !eir key skill is not so much 
their shooting accuracy as their ability to make themselves 
invisible to their targets; interaction with the enemy thus 
lacks the reciprocity of perspectives which is a key aspect of 
normal social interaction, and which makes confrontation 
so di2cult. Snipers are a subset selected from those who are 
good at target practice, but many other good shooters fail 
in the (eld for lack of these specialized interactional skills. 
Snipers put aside thinking of their target as a human; they 
concentrate on the technical calculations of shooting under 
the given conditions of distance, wind, etc. !e combina-
tion of deceptiveness and technical absorption results in 
avoidance of the tension of confrontation, and in highly 
competent violence. !e highest-performing specialists in 
violence use their technical orientation to avoid confronta-
tional tension; they are able to keep their adrenalin level in 
violent action down to a point at which it does not interfere 
with their performance.
Ace (ghter pilots, like top snipers and proactive cops, are 
highly identi(ed with their role, and very aggressive in 
seeking out targets (Collins 2008: 387–98; see Gurney 1958). 
Violent cops are action-seekers, proud of their policing 
skills. !e pilots with the highest number of kills devel-
oped techniques which concentrated on vulnerable spots 
in enemy planes and lines of attack which enabled them to 
approach these spots without being seen. !ey dominated 
the social psychology of the skies, (nding enemy pilots who 
were passive and unaware; their technique was that of at-
tacking the weak, but a variant which required considerable 
learning and subtle perception of others in the social envi-
ronment. At the same time, ace pilots engaged in a version 
of confrontation-avoiding form of (ghting, similar to the 
hitman shooting his victim in the head from behind, since 
the preferred approach was almost always from behind the 
plane and the enemy’s face was rarely seen; the plane was 
the kill, not the pilot.
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On the micro-level, the crucial skill in violence is domi-
nating the emotional attention space. In ordinary non-
con.ictual interaction, there is a tendency for individuals 
to be inducted into a common emotional mood, a shared 
de(nition of the situation; the most enjoyable situations are 
where this emotional contagion reaches the level that Dur-
kheim called collective e&ervescence (Collins 2004a). !is 
helps explain why violent confrontation is interactionally 
di2cult; there is tension between our normal tendency to 
align our micro-behaviors and physiology with others, and 
the action of violence at cross-purposes with the other. !is 
tension causes most violence to abort or to be carried out 
ine&ectively. !e small proportion of persons who become 
e&ective at violence have found a technique for avoiding 
or overcoming ct/f. Only a small proportion of people can 
do this because (among other reasons) only a few persons 
can dominate the emotional attention space at one time; 
others in their presence are dominated, either as victims, 
but also as less active members of the winning team. Only 
one cop can be point man on the SWAT (Special Weapons 
And Tactics) team; and those who are crowded out of the 
violent elite, we may expect, lose their emotional energy for 
this role with the passage of time. Less emotional energy 
means less con(dence, and less risk-taking; the behaviors 
and emotions feed back upon each other. Shi"ing levels of 
emotional engagement and disengagement with the exercise 
of violence can in principle be measured on the micro level, 
although researchers have yet to attempt this.
A career in crime—but also a career as a police o2cer, or a 
sniper or (ghter pilot—is a competition in which many are 
tested in confrontations, and most winnowed out. !us it is 
not merely criminals who tend to end their careers by their 
early twenties, or by age thirty at most. Most other kinds of 
specialists in violence also face a period of burn-out; on the 
micro level, this involves loss of emotional energy—of con-
(dence, enthusiasm, initiative—which comes from being 
overmatched by someone more competent in the micro-
emotional techniques of violence. Conversely, those who 
have developed a trajectory of winning their confrontations 
become further pumped up by episodes of success; their 
emotional energy gives them further commitment to look 
for occasions to use their superior competence at violence. 
!rough a series of competitions in the display of violence, 
some gain emotional energy, others lose it.
At least on the micro level, the (eld of violence is a self-
limiting (eld. It is not possible for everyone, or even a 
majority of a population engaged in an area of violent 
con.ict to be competent at violence. Emotional dominance 
of the confrontation is the main prerequisite for successful 
violence; one must dominate emotionally in order to domi-
nate physically, and emotional dominance is intrinsically 
scarce. From a practical point of view, this is a hopeful sign. 
To reduce violence, we need to take advantage of humans’ 
widespread incompetence at it, and the tendency to limit 
violence to a small number of perpetrators.
2.6. Long-term Causal Sequences, Motivation and Personality
I have concentrated on situational pathways around the 
barrier of ct/f because this is the trigger which determines 
whether or not violence will happen and how much damage 
will ensue. !is may be regarded as the last of a sequence 
of conditions which lead up to the violent situation and 
motivate actors to attempt violence. !us situational theory 
of circumventing ct/f might be integrated into a larger fam-
ily of theories dealing with the sequence of causes which 
precede the sticking point.
I would caution that a heavy emphasis on individual 
motivation can lead us astray, even when treated merely 
as a condition initiating the sequence that brings about 
confrontational situations and ends, at times, in violence. 
!eories which have been constructed to explain common 
forms of criminal violence (poverty, family, etc.) are useless 
in explaining violence on the other side of the law, such as 
police violence, military snipers, ace pilots, not to mention 
upper-class carousing, and middle-class participation in 
demonstrations, political movements, or terrorism. In addi-
tion, situational conditions can launch otherwise unviolent 
individuals into violence. Such situations include not only 
war but also state breakdowns fostering violent crowds and 
paramilitary activities; there is evidence that individuals 
who take part in this kind of politically-initiated violence 
are neither long-term criminals nor even of the disad-
vantaged classes, but are o"en recruited from respectable 
occupations such as teachers, o2cials, sportsmen, and 
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even sociology professors (Derluguian 2005; Volkov 2002). 
Further research is needed on the long-term personality 
patterns of such individuals, even if on the face of it most of 
them have not shown violent and anti-social patterns from 
an early age, but acquired their techniques of violence as the 
unfolding historical situation presented the opportunities.
Since there are a variety of techniques for circumventing 
ct/f, there may be at least (ve di&erent personality pat-
terns of violent persons; the carousing party-(ghter or pub 
brawler surrounded by an ebullient clique is a di&erent type 
than the anti-social, self-withdrawn sniper. !us we might 
pursue the research pathway of tracing individual person-
alities which develop over the course of di&erent kinds of 
violent careers. I would stress that personality should not be 
assumed to be constant over long periods of time; this needs 
to be shown empirically, and the documented pattern of 
falling-o& in at least one type of violence (criminal violence) 
with age and life-course events suggests that an imputed 
violent personality is a construct resting upon stable oppor-
tunities for circumventing the ct/f barrier.
Motivation and personality are both conceptual constructs, 
abstracted from the ground-zero of social reality, the sum 
total of persons’ interactions in micro-social situations. 
From a micro-sociological point of view, human life is a 
sequence or chains of micro-situations; all cognitions, emo-
tions, motivations and behaviors build up in real moments 
of time, and fade away as well if they are not exercized for 
a considerable period. Elsewhere I have presented evidence 
for a model of successful and unsuccessful interaction 
rituals, which generate varying levels of emotional energy 
(Collins 2004a): at the high end of the continuum, an 
individual acquires con(dence, enthusiasm, and initiative 
for particular kinds of social activities; at the low end, failed 
micro-interactions produce depression, avoidance, and 
passivity towards those kinds of encounters. !us moti-
vation for a particular kind of violence (being a military 
sniper, for instance, or an armed robber, or a school bully) is 
constructed as a particular kind of success in an interaction 
ritual chain; and at the core of this success is the develop-
ment of a technique for circumventing ct/f and establishing 
emotional dominance within the situation. Such emotional 
dominance is subject to many situational contingencies, 
however, and thus the individual who reaches the peak of 
violent success will not necessarily stay there. !e ups and 
downs of violent careers, personalities, and motivations 
are best understood in situational chains. In principle, this 
could be investigated by further research.
3. Macro Violence
We turn now to the macro level, where violence is coor-
dinated in large organizations such as states, armies, and 
social movements. Micro and macro theories cannot be 
entirely distinct, since macro always contains micro within 
it. Macro organizations and interorganizational processes 
are full of pockets of micro; but there are also distinctive 
macro patterns that connect small events into larger pat-
terns, and these must be theorized in their own right. An 
organization consists in the sum total of the behavior of 
its members, although we o"en conveniently overlook this 
because the concept of structure concentrates on reciprocal 
interdependencies among individual actors. But an organi-
zation as a whole can do only what its members are capable 
of as micro-situational actors.
!is means that macro violence, to be successful, must (nd 
ways by which organizational agents at the point of contact 
with the enemy can circumvent the barrier of ct/f. It should 
not be taken for granted they will do so. Most soldiers in 
combat, throughout history, have not consistently (red 
their guns or used their weapons against the enemy, and 
when they have done so they were largely incompetent; 
battles are prolonged and stalemated because both sides 
typically miss. I have argued that violence on the micro 
level is largely incompetent and abortive. It should not be 
surprising if the same were true on the macro level.
What the macro-organization of violence does, above all, 
is to train, supply, and transport violent agents to the place 
where they should (ght; and it attempts to discipline them 
to (ght and to keep them from running away. Primitive 
tribal warfare lacked much macro structure, hence battles 
consisted in brief displays of bravado by a few individuals 
charging the enemy and quickly running away. Such battles 
were typically short and ended when there was as little as 
one casualty. !e history of warfare has been the history of 
social inventions for keeping soldiers under control at the 
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front, even in unwieldy and vulnerable formations such as 
marching in lines and columns. Along with this has come 
a history of technological innovation in weapons, mak-
ing them more powerful and eventually, more accurate, at 
greater distances.
!us armies have gravitated towards micro-technique no. 3, 
confrontation-avoiding by remote violence. Early muskets, 
ri.es, and artillery were e&ective mainly when enemies 
came within a few hundred meters of each other or even 
closer; this was in the face-to-face confrontational zone 
and thus put soldiers under great tension in trying to hit 
anyone or even just to (re their guns. Battles were won or 
lost depending on which side was able to break through the 
emotional barrier of ct/f and act with a degree of competent 
violence greater than their opponent. Most of the time both 
sides are approximately equally incompetent, and the result 
is a battle(eld stalemate. Clausewitz coined the term fric-
tion for the fact that in battle hardly anything goes the way 
it should in the strategic plan; friction is a re.ection (among 
other things) of pervasive ct/f. Battles are won, not so much 
by one’s own bravery and competence, but by undergoing 
a little less friction than the enemy. In combat both armies 
are unwieldy and their soldiers largely incompetent through 
ct/f; the one that breaks down last can take advantage of the 
one that breaks down (rst. If one side loses its organization 
and breaks up (sometimes merely through tra2c problems 
in attempting to move to another position), runs away, or 
becomes passive, its opponent can (nd itself in the position 
of attacking the weak (micro-technique no. 1) and become 
energized into a frenzied assault on an emotionally domi-
nated enemy (for an example, see Keegan 1976: 82–114; more 
widely, Collins 2008: 104–11). In e&ect, local victory on a 
battle(eld came about through accidents which allowed one 
side to unleash a forward panic on the other. Most casual-
ties happened a"er one side had broken down socially; this 
produced very one-sided casualty ratios in decisive battles, 
since most killing was done when one side was incapable of 
resisting.
Such forward-panic victories could happen on particular 
parts of the battle(eld, but remain con(ned there if the 
enemy organization held up in other places; in major vic-
tories, disorganization in one place spread throughout the 
army. O"en this happens through attempts to retreat which 
turn into logistical chaos, resulting in further widespread 
demoralization and eventually in surrender. !is is what 
happened in the German conquest of France during six 
weeks in 1940: once the Germans gained momentum in 
movement, the French were never able to recover their or-
ganization or establish an orderly retreat, and were defeated 
by forces which were no larger than their own in troops and 
weapons (including equal numbers of tanks). Victory comes 
through disorganizing the enemy, whether this happens at 
the meso level of a particular part of the battle(eld, or the 
macro level of an entire war.
!ere are two main doctrines of how victory is achieved 
in battle: maneuver and attrition. Maneuver is movement, 
initiative, surprise, positioning one’s troops in locally supe-
rior numbers (or sometimes just locally superior emotional 
energy) to break through the enemy line (although in fact 
what is broken is not so much a line as a mood and an 
organization). If the enemy is demoralized into surrender-
ing in large numbers (e.g. World War II battles on both the 
Western front of 1940 and the Eastern front of 1941–42), 
actual physical casualties may be rather low (surviving as a 
prisoner of war was another matter, especially on the Rus-
sian front where the logistics of war gave lowest priority to 
keeping prisoners alive).
!e doctrine of attrition has gone under various names, 
including frontal assault, prolonged bombardment, so"-
ening up, and force superiority. Here victory is a matter 
of sheer size of relative resources; the side with the larger 
population and the bigger economy will outlast and wear 
down the other. In the American civil war of 1861–65, 
Southern generals were better at maneuver warfare; the 
Union under generals Grant and Sherman eventually hit on 
an attrition strategy which cost many casualties but won the 
war through sheer depth of resources. Attrition is chie.y 
achieved through prolonged use of distance weapons; artil-
lery has caused most casualties throughout the gunpowder 
era, even though the symbolic glory usually went to soldiers 
carrying small arms at the point of contact.
What happens when long-distance weapons become so 
powerful and accurate that the battle(eld becomes largely 
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empty, (ghting between forces which hardly see each other? 
At this point, one would expect ct/f no longer to apply; the 
micro level of confrontation disappears and is replaced by 
thoroughly macro-organizational war. Western military 
doctrine since the 1990s (notably in the United States and 
United Kingdom) has emphasized a high-tech transforma-
tion (sometimes labelled by academics as postmodern war) 
in which precision weapons delivered by aircra" or ground-
based rocket and artillery systems, guided by remote sen-
sors (GPS, infra-red, radar-homing, etc.), and coordinated 
by computers, can hit their targets with a high degree of 
accuracy, controlled by soldier-managers who may be thou-
sands of miles from the battle(eld. US success in the 1991 
Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq are cited as evidence 
of the superiority of this high-tech system over any previous 
military technology and its corresponding social organiza-
tion. From the point of view of violence theory, this is the 
ultimate shi" to long-distance weapons, eliminating ct/f 
and the human emotional element which has historically 
determined victory and defeat in combat. !us some claim 
that Clausewitzian friction has (nally been eliminated.
Biddle, however, has argued that current developments are 
only an extension of a long historical trend towards increas-
ing lethality of distance weapons (2004). He argues that the 
turning point came during World War I, when machine 
guns and artillery made face-to-face confrontation impos-
sible to survive in conventional mass combat formations. 
When two armies equally supplied with modern weapons 
fought, the result was stalemate; the side that exposed itself 
in frontal attack would lose; hence war became attrition 
contests of bombardment in static positions. !e state with 
greater economic resources would eventually win; hence 
war expanded into attacking the enemy’s economic base, 
which became possible in World War II and subsequent 
wars by long-distance bombing and missiles, including 
nuclear weapons. Macro-war thus expanded beyond the 
battle(eld to become a war on the entire society, including 
civilians.
Biddle, however, argues that maneuver war made a come-
back as well (2004); around 1918 all major armies developed 
new tactics, dividing mass troop formations into small 
semi-autonomous groups (ltering forward into enemy 
defenses. Large concentrations of troops and weapons 
provided easy targets for the enemy’s long-distance lethal-
ity; the answer was to disperse, both at the point of attack, 
and defensively in layers of reserve lines many miles in 
depth. Higher lethality thus expands the battle(eld and 
puts a premium on concealment and movement. Armored 
tanks alone did not solve the problem of vulnerability to 
lethal long-distance (re; these too needed dispersion and 
air cover, and mechanized warfare raised logistics costs and 
made supplies a key vulnerability. Under these conditions 
both attrition and maneuver play a part in victory, defeat, 
or stalemate; as enemies became similar to each other in 
tactics, sheer resources and political will to use them deter-
mine the outcome.
An important variant of modern warfare is asymmetrical 
war, fought between one side which has high-precision re-
mote weaponry, and the other side which is technologically 
inferior. !e solution for the weaker has also been to adopt 
their own version of highly lethal remote controlled weap-
ons; roadside bombs detonated by cell phones, for instance, 
continue the trend to dispersed combat by small groups on 
an expanded battle(eld; suicide bombing is warfare by very 
small units operating under concealment.
Here war may return to a species of attrition, with vic-
tory going to the side with deep resources which is willing 
to prolong the combat until the other is worn down. !e 
priority given to enemy body counts by the US military in 
Vietnam was an example of just such an emphasis on mea-
suring the progress of attrition (Gibson 1986). Nevertheless, 
the human emotional element re-enters in another way. 
Casualties in dispersed warfare tend to involve the civilian 
population; modern long-distance communications (espe-
cially the mass media) broadcast the horrors of violence and 
tend to create emotional revulsion in distant populations. 
An emotional element, equivalent to ct/f, reappears on the 
political side; thus a key weapon of the weak is the mobiliz-
ing e&ect of atrocities committed by the other side. !e dy-
namic of these political-military processes has not yet been 
well theorized. Do atrocities cause revulsion against a war, 
and eventual peace? Or do atrocities form a cycle, in which 
each side’s counterattacks provoke moral solidarity within 
the opposing community, leading to unending retaliation? 
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It is o"en said that contemporary war is political war for the 
hearts and minds of the enemy’s supporters; but the trend 
of long-distance weaponry and non-human remote sen-
sors, together with the dispersed battle(eld, is to make the 
high-tech side repeatedly look guilty of atrocities. !e trend 
to pure distance warfare eliminates ct/f but also eliminates 
the ability to identify targets by personal sight. One might 
argue that the trend of war is against the high-tech armies 
because they lose the political war of propagandizing atroci-
ties. Modern peace movements are a part of the trend to 
long-distance communications and the widening battle-
(eld, which has included expanding mass media coverage 
of battle; thus large-scale peace movements arose histori-
cally only in the early twentieth century, the (rst major 
instance being opposition in England to the Boer War. !is 
implies that guerrilla/terrorist tactics always win because 
hiding in civilian populations makes their opponents guilty 
of atrocities. But there are counterexamples, such as Israel 
versus the Palestinians, which suggest that sheer advantage 
of economic resources (in this case including foreign mili-
tary aid) plus political will can keep a state in a perpetual 
state of high-tech war against opponents using the weapons 
of the weak.
What we need is a theory which includes the mobilization 
of both material resources (population and economy) and 
social/emotional resources (group solidarity, organizational 
cohesion and breakdown, emotional energy both high and 
low). Escalation and counter-escalation are a process of 
feedback loops. Typically con.ict causes both sides to mo-
bilize more resources, calling up more troops, making more 
weapons, generating more solidarity, and reinforcing ideo-
logical polarization versus the enemy. !e publicized atroci-
ties of violence by the other side feed back into emotional 
mobilization on one’s own side. Such a process of counter-
escalation, hypothetically, would lead to endless escalation 
on both sides. But in(nitely increasing processes are impos-
sible, and wars do eventually come to an end. !eoretically, 
this must happen either through exhaustion of material 
resources (running out of population and goods, especially 
because they are destroyed by the enemy), or exhaustion of 
emotional/social resources (becoming disorganized or de-
moralized), or both. De-escalation through stalemate is also 
possible, if both sides wear down their resources at an equal 
rate. !e counter-escalation model thus encompasses both 
attrition (winning by wearing down material resources) and 
maneuver (winning by causing the enemy to break down 
socially). !e balance between the two components of vic-
tory is not well understood.
What we need above all is a model incorporating time-
dynamics, explaining how long social/emotional resources 
are e&ective. A classic theory of con.ict, (rst formulated by 
Simmel ([1908] 1964), holds that external con.ict produces 
group solidarity. But how long does such solidarity last? 
Examining patterns of displaying emblems of national 
solidarity a"er the 9/11/2001 attack, I have estimated that 
the peak of solidarity following a violent attack is three 
months, with normal factionalization returning around six 
months (Collins 2004b). We need many more such stud-
ies in a variety of situations to get a full-scale theory of the 
time-dynamics which govern escalation and de-escalation 
of violence; the length of time during which escalation can 
go on di&ers among riots (a few days), full-scale wars (years, 
depending on size of the populations and economies), and 
guerrilla wars (low intensity mobilization which can con-
tinue for decades). Doubtless a theory of the time-dynamics 
of con.ict will require a multi-causal theory, since there are 
many components which go into both material and social/
emotional resources.
As I said at the outset, there are a huge number of kinds 
of violence, and in this short paper I have concentrated 
chie.y on micro-violence and one type of macro violence—
war—which meshes with micro theory most easily through 
the connection between ct/f and Clausewitzian friction. I 
omit here consideration of holocausts and ethnic cleansing 
violence (much progress towards theorizing their condi-
tions has been made, e.g. Mann 2005). But ethnic massacres 
cannot be explained purely on a macro level; allegedly 
long-standing ethnic hostilities nevertheless are ideologi-
cally mobilized at particular points in time; and we can-
not assume that the incitements of remote political leaders 
automatically translate into a chain of command which 
carries out massacres on the ground. Klusemann (2008) 
shows through video and other micro evidence that an eth-
nic massacre has speci(c situational triggers which establish 
emotional moods—a window in time and space where a 
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massacre can be carried out. Here again the micro theory of 
violence has optimistic implications: turning points to vio-
lence also mean that it can be headed o& by the right micro 
situational moves.
Aside from war, a major area of macro violence involves 
the state. !e state itself, in Weber’s famous de(nition, is an 
organization which claims monopoly of legitimate vio-
lence over a territory. Since the work of Skocpol (1979) and 
Goldstone (1991), it has been recognized that a revolutionary 
change in power typically requires state breakdown; dis-
sident movements from below are successful only to the ex-
tent that the state itself becomes ine&ective in its use of re-
pressive force, and this in turn happens through intra-elite 
con.icts, (scal crisis of the state budget, and sometimes 
strains of war. But a state breakdown does not automatically 
lead to the seizure of power by a new regime; the break-
down can be prolonged in paramilitary con.ict or civil 
war, or it could lead to permanent fragmentation of the old 
state’s territory. !e initial phase of revolution—the down-
fall of the old regime—is generally low in casualties. Most 
revolutionary violence develops later—whether in a Reign 
of Terror on the French guillotine, or rival paramilitaries 
(as in the streets of Germany in the 1920s), or extended civil 
war (Russia 1918–22; Japan from the Western incursions of 
the 1850s through 1877; Ireland 1918–23). Klusemann (2009) 
shows that the amount and kind of violence in situations of 
post-revolutionary state breakdown depend, like military 
violence, on rival paramilitary movements solving prob-
lems of material logistics, and on amalgamating a number 
of contending movements into a big movement united by 
ritual/symbolic tactics which give dominance in the realm 
of social/emotional resources.
!ere are a lot of loose ends. On the ultra-macro level, we 
need to integrate a theory of geopolitics—the centuries-
spanning pattern of expansion and contraction in territo-
ries of states, including the question of when and why wars 
start. Our theory is better at the meso question of what 
happens during a war, and what causes a war to end. !e 
rise of the modern state, with its violence-monopolizing, 
tax-collecting, society-penetrating propensities, is itself 
the framework in which other phenomena of con.ict and 
violence arise. Social movements only became possible with 
the rise of the modern state, providing a centralizing arena 
as well as infrastructure to mobilize large-scale movements. 
!e question of when such movements resort to violence, 
and what kind and degree, remains to be theorized. State 
penetration also has an e&ect on macro-trends in crime: for 
instance e&orts at state prohibition or regulation (alcohol, 
drugs, sexwork, etc.) create the conditions for an illegal 
economy, and hence for a pseudo-government or protection 
racket in the form of organized crime. Gangs, as structures 
of illegal violence, range from small neighbourhood prestige 
groups to large coalitions to formalized ma(as; the condi-
tions for the growth and decline of gangs resemble the early 
history of the state itself (Tilly 1986). And I have not even 
touched on the topic of rape, which is tied into so many dif-
ferent institutional levels, micro and macro processes that it 
needs full-scale treatment in a treatise of its own.
4. Conclusions on General Theory
A general theory of violence is a useful orienting device, 
pushing us towards consolidating our insights from 
particular areas of violence and promoting cross-overs 
which crystallize new causal gestalts. What would a general 
theory of violence look like? Surely it will not take the form 
of simple statements such as “poverty and discrimination 
cause violence”; “discipline leads to rebellion”; or “frustra-
tion causes aggression.” Any general theory must include 
nested levels of macro and micro conditions. And it must 
incorporate, on the micro-interactional level, the barrier of 
ct/f and situational con(gurations which cause this to be 
circumvented.
We are not nearly in sight of our end, a comprehensive the-
ory of violence in all its forms. But, as Winston Churchill 
said, we may be at the end of the beginning.
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